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GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW AND THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MARKETS
KURT

I.

E. MARKERT*

INTRODUCTION

The economy of the Federal Republic of Germany, since the 1950s,
has been generally marked by a high and still growing degree of internationalization, especially in production and marketing of industrial products. An illustration of this is the substantial share of export and import
trade in Gross National Product (GNP)' and the amount of direct foreign investments by German investors abroad and foreign investors in
Germany. 2 Undoubtedly, this trend toward more economic internationalization is largely due to Germany's active participation in the post-war
European integration process and in particular its membership, since
1958, in the European Economic Community (EEC). This latter factor
gained new momentum when the EEC, enlarged from the original six
founding countries (France, Italy, Germany and the three Benelux countries) to twelve members (adding United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark,
Spain, Portugal, Greece), adopted the Single European Act of February
28, 19863 as a new effort to achieve, by the end of 1992, the final goal of
the EEC, which is to merge the economies of the member states into a
single internal market comparable to the United States market.
Undoubtedly, the increasing global and European market internationalization has also affected the role and content of German antitrust
law laid down in the Act Against Restraints of Competition (ARC). 4
The growing appearance of foreign competitors on many domestic mar* Director, German Federal Cartel Office. Hon. Professor of Law, Free University of Berlin.
M.C.J. 1959, New York University; Dr. Jur. 1961, University of Wiirzburg.
1. In 1987 German exports of goods and services totaled 638 billion deutschmark (DM) accounting for 32.6% of the GNP. The respective figures concerning imports are 524 billion DM and
27%. 1988 WIRTSCHAFr UND STATISTIK 157 (translation of this and all other German sources by
the author).
2. German direct investments abroad in 1986 totaled 11.2 billion DM; foreign investments in
Germany that year totalled 5.8 billion DM. See 1986 JAHRESBERICHT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG
203, 241.

3. Signing of the Single European Act, BULL. EUR. Comm., Apr. 1986, at 7.
4. Law of July 27, 1957, as amended 1965, 1973, 1976 and 1980. A complete version of the
ARC incorporating these amendments is officially published in Gesetz gegen WettbewerbsbeschrAnkungen in der Neufassung, 1980 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] I 1761 (W. Ger). Further
amendments of the ARC, not affecting substantive law, were brought about by the Gesetz zur Bereinigung wirtschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften, 1985 BGBI I 457 (W. Ger).
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kets greatly improved competitive conditions, thereby relieving antitrust
law from the difficult task of providing remedies for situations of insufficient competition. On the other hand, antitrust concern has increasingly
focused on the danger that, after the abolition of public barriers to foreign competition, such barriers might be replaced by private restrictive
arrangements such as home market protection agreements, "orderly
marketing" schemes or other "self-restraint" systems. This concern of
the German legislator is, in particular, reflected in section 98(2), already
in the original text of the ARC of 1957, which expressly covers restrictions in international trade affecting competition in German territory. 5
This text also dealt already with the relationship between German and
European antitrust law. 6 Therefore, the antitrust problems raised by the
globalization of markets in general, and by the growing economic integration process in Europe in particular, do not appear to be entirely new
and to call for dramatic new solutions. Rather, the question is whether
in light of the present stage of this development and the experiences with
antitrust law application in Germany and in the EEC the "old" solutions
are still suitable to present economic conditions or whether some, perhaps only slight, modifications have become necessary.
In this article I cannot discuss the entire range of aspects involved in
such a reconsideration. Rather, I shall concentrate on What I regard,
from a practical point of view in the German context, as the two central
issues: (1) the relevance of market internationalization to the legal questions of defining the relevant geographic market in antitrust cases and
evaluating market conditions to determine whether one or several firms
have market power in the legal sense; and (2) the influence of EEC antitrust law on the applicability of the national antitrust laws of the EEC
member states as exemplified by German law. In dealing with these two
issues I shall further concentrate on merger control law. Although these
issues may also be important in regard to the various other types of conduct covered by German and EEC antitrust law, the interest of law prac5. ARC § 98(2) provides that the ARC applies to all restraints of competition having effects
within Germany. On the interpretation of this rule and its application, see generally Gerber, The
Extraterritorial Application of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983); Markert,
The Application of German Antitrust Law to International Restraints on Trade, VA. J. INT'L L., Apr.
1967, at 47.
6. ARC § 101(3) provides that the ARC does not apply insofar as the Treaty Establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community of April 18, 1951 contains special provisions. On the other
hand, it contains no provisions in regard to the antitrust rules of the EEC Treaty. However, this
Treaty in article 87(2)(e) provides that the relationship between its antitrust rules and the antitrust
laws of the member states may be specified by a Council Regulation. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 49 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. But the
Council to date has not yet made use of this power.
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titioners and the business community clearly focuses on merger law.
This is reflected by the development of the discussion in Germany concerning whether, as a question of law, the relevant geographic market in
antitrust cases under the ARC must always be limited to the domestic
territory or may, in cases of sufficient internationalization of business activities, traverse that territory. This discussion on the admissibility of
transborder market definitions became of major practical concern only
after the insertion of merger control provisions into the ARC by the 1973
amendment, 7 especially because this step was coupled with the introduction of market share presumptions relating to the statutory market domi8
nation criterion used by the law to identify anticompetitive mergers.
Controversies over this issue increased when the 1980 amendment to the
ARC, by adding a new section 23a, included further market share presumptions. 9 Similarly, controversies about the priority of community antitrust law over the national antitrust laws of the member states, at least
from a political and practical point of view, mainly affect merger control
law. This is illustrated in particular by the great difficulties encountered
by the EC-Commission in its attempt to persuade the governments of the
member states to adopt an EEC regulation establishing a European system of merger control.' 0
7. See ARC §§ 22(3), 24(1). On the 1973 amendment generally, see Markert, The New German Antitrust Reform Law, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 135 (1974). On merger control in Germany, see
Markert, Merger Control in Western Europe: National and InternationalAspects, in COMPETITION
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND POLICY ON RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES 293 (0. Schachter &
R. Hellawell eds. 1981) [hereinafter Markert, Merger Control].
8. See, e.g., Oliver, Internationalizing Markets-Effects on German Competition Policy and
Law, WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV., Feb. 1988, at 19, 22-3 1. My own view against transborder market definitions in German merger law was already exposed in Markert, Die Anwendung
der Deutschen Fusionskontrolle (§ 23ff. GWB) auf Zusammenschlisse mit und zwischen ausldndischen Unternehmen, in SCHWERPUNKTE DES KARTELLRECHTS 1980/81: VERWALTUNGS UND
RECHTSPRECHUNGSPRAXIS REFERATE DES NEUNTEN FIW-SEMINARS 1981, at 91, 94-98 (1982).
9. See ARC §§ 23a(1)(l)(a), 23a(2).
10. Unlike article 66 of the Coal and Steel Community Treaty, Treaty Instituting the European
Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], the EEC
Treaty Contains no express provision for merger control. See EEC Treaty, supra note 6. The European Communities Court of Justice has held, however, that a merger effected by a market dominating firm may constitute an abuse of dominant market power and be prohibited under article 86.
Europemballage Corp. v. Commission of the Eur. Comm., [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8171, at 8279-3, (Feb. 21, 1973) [hereinafter Continental Can Case]. Recently
the sixth chamber of that court held that the acquisition by one firm of an equity interest in a
competitor may also violate article 85 which prohibits cartel agreements. British Am. Tobacco Co.
v. Commission of the Eur. Comm., [Current Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405, at 17,718
(Nov. 17, 1987) [hereinafter Philip Morris-Rothmans]. Since the application of articles 85 and 86 to
mergers is an inappropriate basis for a comprehensive merger control system, the EC Commission,
since 1973, has sought additional legislation. On the first draft of 1973, see Markert, EEC Competition Policy in Relation to Mergers, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 107 (1975). The text of the Feb. 23, 1988
draft is published in Amended Proposalfor a Council Regulation (EEC)on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 130) 4 (1988) [hereinafter Merger
Regulation].
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MARKET DEFINITION AND FOREIGN COMPETITION IN GERMAN
MERGER CONTROL LAW

The merger control provisions of the ARC (sections 23 - 24a) expressly use the terms "market" and "market share." The need to define
the relevant market or markets in each case arising under these provisions is therefore even more obvious than in United States merger law
under section 7 of the Clayton Act 1 where fnarket definition may be
seen more as an analytical aid for assessing whether competition is likely
to be substantially lessened by the merger in question.12 Market shares
of twenty percent or more are also among the data that must be included
to comply with the statutory merger notification requirements under sections 23(1) and 24a(l) of the ARC. Of primary importance in the substantive law context is the reliance in section 24(1) on the concept of
market domination as the central criterion to identify anticompetitive
mergers 13 and the employment of several statutory market share pres p... s s. ,,indications nf dominant market power.' 4 That the general
market domination concept requires a definition of the relevant market is
confirmed by section 22(1)(2) defining, as one- form of market domination, a firm that.has a superior market position in relation to its competitors and stating that, for the evaluation of this position, its market share
together with other specified criteria has to be taken into account. This
provision also has relevance in "oligopoly" cases since, under section
22(2), a group of several leading firms on the market is deemed to be
market dominating if there is no substantial competition between the
group members and together they have a superior market position in relation to their outsider competitors.
The market share presumptions are specified in sections 22(3) and
23a. Section 22(3)(1) presumes market domination by a single firm, if it
has a market share of one third or more, unless its global turnover proceeds during the last business year were less than 250 million
Deutschmark (DM). Under section 22(3)(2) "oligopoly" market domina11. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
12. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 41 (1977).
13. Under § 24(1) of the ARC, the Federal Cartel Office (FCO), having exclusive jurisdiction to
intervene against anticompetitive mergers under ARC § 44(l)(1)(d), has to prohibit mergers not
falling under the de minimis criteria of § 24(8) if there is reason to expect that the merger creates or
strengthens a market dominating position, unless the parties to the merger prove that it also brings
about improvements of the competitive conditions outweighing the disadvantages of the market
domination. The only exception is the special ministerial power under § 24(3) to authorize, on public policy grounds, mergers prohibited by the FCO as anticompetitive.
14. For further details on the market domination concept of ARC § 22 and its application in
cases of abusive market conduct, see Markert, The Control of Abuses by Market-DominatingEnterprises Under German Antitrust Law, II CORNELL INT'L L.J. 275 (1978).
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tion is presumed if the two or three leading firms together have an aggregate market share of fifty percent or more or the four or five leading firms
together have a share of two thirds or more. Small firms with less than
100 million DM annual turnover proceeds do not fall under this presumption. The 1980 amendment, in a new section 23a, added a further
"oligopoly" presumption specifically for merger control purposes. Using
the same market share criteria, this presumption may be rebutted only
where the parties can show either that the conditions for competition
permit the expectation that substantial competition on the market will
continue to prevail after the completion of the merger or that the "oligopoly" group as a whole has no superior market position in relation to
the other competitors in the market. 15 Section 23a also presumes that a
merger will create or strengthen a superior market position of the merging firms if one of these firms, during the last business year preceding the
merger, had turnover proceeds of at least 2000 million DM and the other
firm is active in a market in which small and medium-sized firms together have an aggregate market share of two thirds or more and the
merging firms have a market share of five percent or more (section
23a(l)(a)).
The duty of merging firms to state in merger notifications all their
market shares if the latter are twenty percent or more applies both to
premerger notifications under section 24a(1) and to postmerger notifications under section 23(1). In practical terms, the premerger notification
requirement of section 24a(l), second sentence, which applies to "big"
mergers, 16 is of primary interest, because like section 7 of the Clayton
Act, this requirement is coupled with waiting periods that do not begin
to run until the notification is "complete."' 17 Since the merging firms are
usually interested in obtaining early clearance to be able to consummate
the merger plan, it is of great importance to them to submit a "complete"
15. ARC § 23a(2) does not, however, apply where the merging firms' combined market share is
under 15%. For a detailed analysis of court and FCO practice regarding § 23a(2), see Markert, Die

Praktische Bedeutung der Qualifizierten Oligopolvermutung in der Fusionskontrolle (§23a Ab& 2
GWB), 41 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER [BB] 1660 (1986).

16. "Big" is defined in terms of annual turnover proceeds: either as each participating firm
having one thousand million DM or more per year, or as one participant having two thousand
million DM or more including, in both cases, turnover of affiliated firms.
17. The first period is up to one month. If the FCO, before the end of that period, informs the
notifying firms that it will conduct a more thorough investigation of the case, the waiting period
further extends to up to four months. Execution of mergers subject to compulsory advance notification before clearance is given or the waiting period has expired is an offense subject to fines and
invalidation of the transactions. On the other hand, after clearance or expiration of the waiting
period the merger is deemed to be immune, unless the exceptions of § 24a(2) apply (e.g., false statements by the notifying firms). Private antitrust actions against mergers are not permissible in
Germany.
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notification including all relevant market shares as soon as possible and
thus limit their maximum waiting time." Of much less practical importance is the duty under section 23(1) to give notice of consummated
mergers including those already given notice of as proposed mergers
under section 24a(1).
Two aspects of section 23(1) are, however, of particular interest in
the present context. Under section 23(l)(1)(a), market share of twenty
percent or more of the merging firms is in itself sufficient to bring a consummated merger under the notification system of section 23(1). While
failure to notify does not affect the legality of the merger, it does constitute an administrative offense subject to fines of up to fifty thousand DM.
Furthermore, section 23(l)(1) expressly provides that the market share
of twenty percent or more refers to "the entire territory in which this Act
applies or a substantial part thereof." This wording is the strongest indication that the German legislature, while not directly dealing with the
question of transborder market definitions in enacting the law on mergers, obviously proceeded on the premise that the relevant geographic
market in merger cases may be, where appropriate, smaller than the entire domestic territory, but may not extend beyond national boundaries.
Otherwise, the duty to give notice of market shares relating to the domestic market or a substantial part thereof would not make sense. This view
is expressed, for example, in the parliamentary committee report on the
1973 amendment introducing merger control rules where it is said that
the relevant geographic market can only be the domestic market as a
whole or a part of it.19 This clarifies an earlier statement by the same
committee in its report on the 1965 amendment, adopted before merger
control was included in the ARC, that the relevant market in the particular case might also be the larger territory of the EEC or even the "world
20
market."
In administering the merger control provisions of the ARC, the
Federal Cartel Office (FCO) and the two appellate courts having jurisdiction in merger control cases, the Berlin Court of Appeals (Kammergericht) and Federal Supreme Court, have clearly followed the guidance
18. Under FCO practice the relevant markets for the purpose of notification are frequently
determined by stipulation with merging firms. The same applies to the data and methods for computing the shares of the merging firms on the stipulated markets. The stipulated market definitions
are not necessarily identical with the definitions on which the final substantive law evaluation is
based. Not infrequently the latter definitions can only be made on the basis of a thorough market
investigation after the notification was made.
19. Bericht des Ausschussesfir Wirtschaft, 23 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB [WuW] 581
(1973) (BT DRUCKSACHE 7/765).
20. Auszug aus dem Schriftlichen Bericht des Wirtschaft-sausschusses zur Kartellgesetznovelle
vom. 10. Juni 1965, 15 WuW 834 (1965) (BT DRUCKSACHE 4/3533).
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of the 1973 legislature. In none of the seventy-two cases as of December
31, 1987 in which the FCO issued a formal prohibition order under section 24(1), stating in detail the reasons why, in the opinion of the FCO,
the merger was anticompetitive in the sense of this provision, was the
relevant geographic market defined as extending beyond national boundaries, although in a number of these cases internationally traded products
were involved. Appellate decisions in several dozen of these cases show
the same picture. The Monopolies Commission, on the basis of a thorough discussion of this practice in light of the criticism especially voiced
by business circles, in its 1978/79 biennial report, has taken the same
21
position.
In its 1980/81 report, the Monopolies Commission suggested, however, that the FCO in several non-intervention cases had defined wider
geographic markets, 22 and several commentators referring to this report
have seen this as an indication that the FCO is no longer adhering to its
original policy. 23 In my opinion, the cases mentioned by the Commission
do not support this conclusion. Clarification of this controversial point is
particularly difficult since the only source of information is the internal
files of the FCO which are not accessible to outsiders. Although I cannot
rule out the possibility that the FCO case reporters' final evaluation
memoranda in these cases have not always clearly distinguished between
geographic market definition and the taking into account of foreign competition in determining whether the merger in question creates or
strengthens a market dominating position of the merging firms, it appears to me that the Commission has misinterpreted the statements made
in these memoranda. 24 However that may be, the FCO in its 1985/86
21. III
MONOPOLKOMMISSION,
FUSIONSKONTROLLE
BLEIBT
VORRANGIG:
HAUPTGUTACHTEN 1978/1979 163-77 (1980). Under § 24b the Monopolies Commission has to report
every two years on the application of the law on dominant firms including merger control law. For
the preparation of these reports the Commission has access to the internal FCO files.
22. IV MONOPOLKOMMISSION, FORTSCHRIrTE
HAUPTGUTACHTEN 1980/1981 161-63 (1982).

BEI

DER

KONZENTRATIONS-ERFASSUNG:

23. See, e.g., K. AUTENRIETH, DIE GRENZUBERSCHREITENDE FUSIONSKONTROLLE IN THEORIE UND PRAXIS: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR KONTROLLE TRANSNATIONALER UNTERNEHMENSZUSAMMENSCHLUSSE
33-36 (1982); J. KEVEKORDES, AUSLANDSZUSAMMENSCHLUSSE
IM
INTERNATIONALEN UND MATERIELLEN KARTELLRECHT 171-72 (1986); Oliver, supra note 8, at 24.

24. It should be mentioned that under ARC § 48(2) the individual cases are to be decided by
the deciding divisions to which the cases are assigned according to the economic sectors involved in
the case. For making a decision a quorum of three members is required consisting of the chairman,
the case reporter and a third member designated by the chairman. The final deliberation on a case is
usually made on the basis of a written memorandum by the case reporter. If a majority agrees with
the reporter's proposal not to oppose the merger, there is usually no separate statement of the majority's detailed reasons. The reporter's memorandum does not therefore necessarily reflect the majority view on all the issues of the case including geographic market definition. It seems that the
Monopolies Commission in arriving at its conclusions on transborder market definitions in its 1980/
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activity report in light of the controversy and the continuing criticism
especially from business circles has again made it clear that, as a matter
of law, the relevant geographic market is limited to domestic territory,
and that the reasons put forward in favor of transborder market definitions can only be taken into account in the assessment of the competitive
situation in the domestic market. 25
In my opinion, the FCO's position is both legally and practically
sound and the critical counterarguments, as for example those put forward in an especially pointed manner in the Oliver article,2 6 are unfounded. Transborder market definitions are already questionable for
reasons of international law and policy. It is obvious that essentially any
national merger control system's legitimate concern can only be that domestic buyers enjoy sufficient sellers' competition and that mergers do
not jeopardize the conditions for such competition by creating too much
sellers' concentration. If, therefore, the "area of effective competition" to
be dealt with by national merger control law is the geographic area where
domestic buyers are located, i.e. national territory, it is only logical that
this area should be the geographically relevant market with regard to
which the question of whether sufficient competition exists needs closer
examination and eventually, if the answer is negative, appropriate antitrust action. It goes without saying that this approach, to be sensible
from an economic point of view, must take full account of all aspects that
have relevance for competition within that area, including actual and potential competition by sellers from outside. The situation in this respect
is not different from the domestic regional market cases where the geographic "area of effective competition" is limited to a particular section
of national territory and where all competitive influences from the
"outside" are also taken into account.
The opposite approach of defining a transborder market in all cases
of products and services with a substantial share of international trading
risks overstepping the legitimate scope of national merger control law
1981 report has not sufficiently considered this aspect. See MONOPOLKOMMISSION, supra note 22, at
161-63.
25. BUNDESKARTELLAMT, BERICHT DES BUNDESKARTELLAMTS UBER SEINE TATIGKEIT IN
DEN JAHREN 1985/86 SOWIE UBER DIE LAGE UND ENTWICKLUNG AUF SEINEM AUFGABENGEBIET (§ 50 GWB), 1985/86 TATIGKEITBERICHT 16-18 (1987) (BT DRUCKSACHE 11/554).
An English translation of the full text of the respective chapter entitled "International Competitive
Conditions" is reprinted in the appendix to this article. On FCO recent policy in this context, see
also Kartte, Internationale Wettbewerbsfahigkeit und Zusammenschlusskontrolle, in STRAFRECHT,
UNTERNEHMENSRECHT, ANWALTSRECHT:

FESTSCHRIFT FUR GERD PFEIFFER ZUM ABSCHIED

AUS DEM AMT ALS PR.SIDENT DES BUNDESGERICHiTSHOFES 531 (0. von Gamm, P. Raisch & K.
Tiedemann, eds. 1988) [hereinafter FESTSCHRIFT FUR GERD PFEIFFER].
26. Oliver, supra note 8, at 26-27.
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concern, because it necessarily leads to judgments as to the competitive
situation in other countries whose territories are included in the wider
market. If such a market is judged as sufficiently competitive and, in
consequence, no action under merger control law is taken, the other
countries will probably not regard this as an inadmissible intrusion into
their internal affairs. That the same is also true in the opposite case is at
least doubtful. Suppose, for example, that the FCO in a merger case
which also involves British, French or Swiss firms would define a wider
European geographic market including the territories of these countries
and on the basis of a finding that the merging firms either by themselves,
or as members of an "oligopoly" group as a result of the merger, would
dominate that market and therefore prohibit the merger under section
24(1), this would seem almost certain to create problems with the governments of these countries. One cannot entirely avoid the impression
that the proponents of wide transborder market definitions tacitly assume
that such a conflict will never arise because in the wider market no single
firm or "oligopoly" group of leading firms will ever reach the market
power line.
A second aspect supporting FCO market definition policy is the
enormous practical difficulty in providing the necessary information for
the calculation of market share as a notification requirement and substantive law criterion that would arise, if the relevant geographic market
in the particular case were to include foreign territories. FCO experience
from the several thousand merger cases examined since 1973 is that the
only reliable method of calculating market shares is to collect the figures
about all sales actually made in the relevant market during a certain period of time. Since these figures are usually not publicly available and
frequently even treated by the firms as business secrets, access by the
FCO to the sales figures of the competitors of the merging firms can only
be gained by applying the investigatory powers under section 46 of the
ARC. 27 These powers are clearly not available with respect to information regarding sales of foreign enterprises in foreign territories. 28 The
merging firms, being interested in early clearance, may be able to submit
27. The duty to comply with FCO requests for information under ARC § 46 also includes firms
not involved in the particular case. Incorrect or incomplete answers are an offense under ARC
§ 39(1) and subject to fines up to 50,000 DM. This sanction ensures a high degree of reliability
together with the power, also provided under § 46, to inspect and examine the business records of
the firms at their locations. The fact that requested information includes business secrets is no justification to refuse to submit them. The FCO is, however, under a duty to protect such information.
On the special problems raised by protecting business secrets in court proceedings involving mergers,
see Werner, Der Konflikt zwischen Geheimnisschutz und Sachaufkldrung im Kartellverfahren, in
FESTSCHRIFT FUR GERD PFEIFFER, supra note 25, at 821.

28. See Stockmann, Kartellbehdrdliche Ermittlungen im Ausland, 25 WuW 243 (1975).
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their own foreign sales figures, but will usually be unable to provide reliable data about their competitors' sales. Direct contacts with the antitrust
authorities of the other countries, even in those cases where no general
"blocking" attitude as to the supply of information to foreign authorities
and courts in antitrust matters prevails, are not a reliable source of information either, especially where confidential information about national
firms is involved. It would be rather peculiar to assume that the German
legislature enacted a largely market-share-based merger law system while
realizing that such a system was widely unworkable because in all cases
of economically international markets the market shares of the firms involved which would be necessary for the application of the market share
criteria could not be reliably ascertained.
Despite these foreign policy and information collection problems,
the present position on possible transborder market definitions could
probably not be maintained any longer, if what the critics of this policy
assert were basically correct, namely that the limitation of the geographic
market to the domestic territory, regardless of whether there is substantial international trading in the relevant product or service, frequently
results in relatively high market shares of the domestic firms on the market and thereby forces the FCO and the courts to prohibit, as anticompetitive under section 24(1), more mergers than is justified by real market
conditions. 29 Admittedly, the actual market shares of the domestic
firms, for such reasons as local buyer preferences, transportation costs or
even "buy-at-home" mentality, are usually higher, if the geographic market is limited to national territory, than they would be in a wider transborder market. 30 But "optically" high market shares of the leading
domestic seller or sellers calculated on the basis of a geographic market
limited to domestic territory would lead to "wrong" findings of actual
market power only if market share data were given too much weight in
this context. However, neither the fact that the market share in section
22(1)(2) is expressly listed among the factors to be considered for the
29. This assertion is made in a particularly pointed manner by Oliver, who argues, inter alia,
that "the fundamental flaw of presuming merger activity to be prohibited on the basis of inaccurate
market share data discourages mergers and acquisitions needed for competing in larger international
markets" and that "[t]he limitation of geographic markets to within the Federal Republic, combined
with the presumption of market domination based on market shares, is overly rigid, inefficient, and
disguises inaccurate analysis." Oliver, supra note 8, at 31. In discussing one of the cases in which the
FCO prohibited a merger (the Thyssen-HUller merger), Oliver even accuses the FCO of "blind reliance on the Federal Republic as the relevant geographic market, with the virtual exclusion of an
analysis of international data and the general competitive situation in international markets." Id. at
35.
30. This is true also if a national market is divided into several regional or local markets. The
market share figures of the firms selling in all these markets will remain the same only if they all sell
nationwide and if there is no regional or local sales concentration of particular sellers.
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finding of a superior market position as a form of market domination,
nor the various market share presumptions in sections 22(3) and 23a as
interpreted by court jurisprudence justify such a conclusion.
In its judgment in the merger case of Kl6ckner-Becorit31 the Federal
Supreme Court held that the market share presumptions of section 22(3)
do not relieve the FCO and the Court of Appeals of their "normal" factfinding obligation. 32 The court also held that, if the firm under review
has a market share of a third or more, actual competition on the market
cannot be automatically disregarded for the final assessment of whether
that firm was in fact market dominating. 33 In its later judgment in the
Metro-Kaujhof 34 merger case the Federal Supreme Court treated the
presumptions of section 23a(l) as having the same legal status as the
presumptions in section 22(3). Only the "qualified" "oligopoly" presumption of section 23a(2) has not yet been interpreted by the Supreme

Court. 35 But the Berlin Court of Appeals in its judgment in the Morris-

Rothmans merger case has held that even though section 23a(2) formally
shifts the burden of proof to the merging firms, it does not extend to
31. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., WuW/E [BGH] 1749, 1754-55
(Klckner-Becorit) [hereinafter Klckner-Becorit]. The case involved a horizontal merger between
two leading German manufacturers of mining machinery with an aggregate domestic market share
in 1975-1977 of 42%. The main competitor, a relatively small firm, had 31%. While the Berlin
Court of Appeals affirmed the FCO prohibition order, the Federal Supreme Court reversed, mainly
on grounds of actual competition and strong buyer concentration. Potential competition by the
British manufacturer Gullick Dobson was not an issue because that firm had capital links with one
of the merging firms.
32. Under general administrative law, the FCO as an administrative authority has to investigate and establish all necessary factual elements for applying its powers in a particular case. Under
ARC § 69(1), the Berlin Court of Appeals, when asked on appeal to review an FCO decision, is also
required to investigate the facts of the case on its own motion. This obligation is particularly important in merger cases, since the Court of Appeals has to render its decision on the legality of the
merger under review on the basis of the factual situation at the time of its final hearing.
33. On the relevance of actual competition before the merger for the prediction of whether or
not the merger under review will give rise to market dominating power under § 24(1), see Markert,
Zur Bedeutung von Marktstruktur undverhalten in der materiellen Fusionskontrolle des GWB, in
NEUORIENTIERUNG DES WETTBEWERBSSCHUTZES 123 (1986).'

34. Judgment of Mar, 11, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., WuW/E [BGH] 2231, 2237
(Metro-Kaufhof). The Supreme Court in this case reversed the appellate court decision, which had
affirmed the FCO prohibition order, mainly on product market definition grounds ("cash and carry"
food wholesaling, excluding all other supply. alternatives open to retailers, is too narrow). The
court's holding on § 23a(1) refers to the size presumption of § 23a(l)(2).
35. In the Philip Morris-Rothmansmerger case where the court, for the first time, was asked to
review a prohibition based on § 23a(2), the court did not reach the substantive and international law
issues of the case. Instead, the court merely held that, after the restructuring of the arrangement
between the parties, the result no longer technically constituted a merger in the legal sense. See
Judgment of Oct. 29, 1985, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., WuW/E [BGH] 2211 (Morris-Rothmans)
[hereinafter Morris-Rothmans11].On further details of this case, see Gerber, supra note 5, it77679. Clearance, in view of the restructuring of the deal, was also given under EC antitrust law. See
British Am. Tobacco Co. v. Commission of the Eur. Comm., supra note 10.
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factors which are not within these firms' control. 36 Contrary to what is
asserted by critics of present German practice, 37 it has therefore been
unnecessary to resort to the "corrective provisions" of the law to compensate for the alleged rigidity of domestic market definitions. 38
The fact that the various market share presumptions have not led to
overly rigid restrictions on merger activity in Germany is reflected in the
FCO merger statistics. In the 802 cases of proposed or completed mergers in 1987 which fell under substantive merger control law and were
examined thereunder, only two prohibition orders were issued. 39 There
is no statistical record of the number of merger cases where the participating firms had a market share of one third or more, but the presumption of market domination in section 22(3)(1) was regarded by the FCO
as having been rebutted. In my estimation the percentage of such cases is
far higher than fifty. My analysis of FCO enforcement practice regarding the "qualified" oligopoly presumption of section 23a(2) from 1980 to
198540 showed that the rate of "no-rebuttal" cases was, at best, less than
ten percent. 4 1 The respective rate concerning the presumption of section
23a(1) No. la appears to be much lower, in fact there is only one case
where this presumption was used by the Berlin Court of Appeals as a
36. Judgment of July 1, 1983, Kammergericht, W. Ger., WuW/E [OLG] 3051, 3071 (MorrisRothmans) [hereinafter Morris-Rothmans1]. An English translation of this judgment is published in
Philip Morris Inc. v. Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office), 7 Eur. Com. Cas. 393 (1984).
37. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 8, at 27-31.
38. Rebuttal of the presumptions cannot be regarded as such a "corrective provision" because,
as was pointed out earlier, the presumptions do not affect the duty of the FCO and the Court of
Appeals to conduct a full investigation of all aspects of the case. The "balancing-clause" in § 24(1) is
also irrelevant in the present context, since "improvements of the competitive conditions" within the
meaning of this clause can only refer to the domestic market. Contrary to what is said in Mr.
Oliver's article, Oliver, supra note 8, at 29 & n.56, the FCO decision in the Bohringer-BioDynamics
merger case is no exception. The FCO, in holding that the merger with Bio Dynamics did not
strengthen Bhringer's domestic market dominating position, merely noted that the improved access
by B6hringer to the U.S. market was not sufficient to strengthen domestic market domination. The
"balancing clause" of § 24(1) in this context was neither discussed nor applied. The only "corrective
provision" in the present context is therefore § 24(3) allowing for ministerial exemptions in cases of
market dominating mergers. Although § 24(3) expressly provides that for the decision on applications for such an exemption "regard shall also be given to the competitive capability of the participating enterprises in markets outside the territory in which this Act applies," exemptions on such
grounds were neither applied for nor granted. See also BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 25.
39. To be published in the 1987/1988 FCO Activity Report. The respective figures for the two
year period 1985-1986 are: 1343 merger cases and 9 prohibition orders. Not all of these orders
became final.
40. Markert, supra note 15. This analysis also takes into account cases of clearance after a
settlement on the basis of partial divestiture (25 cases as of December 31, 1986).
41. Id. at 1664-65. The case of the merger between Philip Morris and Rothmans is one of the
few examples where the FCO, in prohibiting a merger, primarily relied on the presumption of ARC
§ 23a(2). On the other hand, in the Court of Appeals opinion upholding the FCO order the presumption is only used as a supplementary argument. Morris-Rothmans I, supra note 36. The Federal Supreme Court's opinion in this case did not deal with § 23a(2). Morris-Rothmans II, supra
note 35.

GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW

supplementary reason for its finding that the merger under review resulted in a market dominating position. 42 Even if one takes into account
that there are cases where merger plans were dropped by the parties after
the FCO had indicated opposition based on the market share presumptions, 43 this does not significantly change the general picture.
Of course, the full impact of limiting the relevant geographic market
to German territory and of the various market share presumptions can
only be assessed on the basis of a thorough analysis of a sufficiently broad
variety of cases involving international competition aspects. However,
the limited space available in this article prevents me from attempting
such a comprehensive operation Therefore, the following description
must be limited to a few, in my estimation, typical examples.
In 1986 the FCO did not oppose the acquisition by Kraftwerk
Union (KWU) AG, a subsidiary of Siemens AG, of an eighty-five percent interest in the Exxon Nuclear Company (ENC), a United States
subsidiary of Exxon Corporation, New Jersey. KWU and ENC, through
its German subsidiary Exxon Nuclear GmbH, Lingen, were the only two
domestic producers of fuel elements for nuclear power plants, with an
aggregate share in the actual supply of such elements to German electricity generating enterprises operating such plants of almost 100 percent.
Nevertheless, the FCO did not regard the merger as giving rise to, or
strengthening, a market dominating position on the domestic market for
nuclear fuel elements. The main reasons for this conclusion were the
existence of fully competitive foreign suppliers in France and Sweden
which had already made small amounts of actual sales to domestic buyers and the policy of these buyers not to rely, for security reasons, on a
single source of supply. KWU and ENC, in the opinion of the FCO,
could therefore not be expected to preserve their extremely high combined market share. The fact that the purpose of the merger, as
presented by KWU, was to enter the United States market did not play a
decisive role in the FCO's assessment. 44
That the actual market shares of foreign suppliers frequently do not
42. Judgment of March 22, 1983, Kammergericht, W. Ger., WuW/E [OLG] 2862 (ReweFlorimex). The relevant market was flower wholesaling in southern Germany.
43. According to the 1985/86 FCO Activity Report, there are 150 cases where merger plans
were given up or modified or completed mergers were dissolved after a preliminary examination by
the FCO Bundeskartellamt. BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 25, at 7. It is not possible to identify
the actual reasons of the firms involved for not pursuing their merger. My estimation is that in a
substantial number of these cases antitrust considerations were not ultimately decisive.
44. No official publication on this case was made by the FCO. Had the finding in this case been
that the merger was anticompetitive on the German market, the argument that the merger improved
KWU's competitive position on the U.S. market could only have been taken into account as a reason
for granting a ministerial exemption under ARC § 24(3). See also supra note 38.
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show the full competitive potential of these suppliers and must therefore
be "upgraded" when being considered in an overall evaluation, is also
illustrated by the case of the acquisition of Garbe Lahmeyer & Co. (GL)
AG by Bergmann Electro Gesellschaft mbH, a company controlled by
Siemens AG. 4 5 The relevant market in this case was the supply of heavy
electric motors to German industrial buyers. Although Siemens was already the leading seller before the merger and together with GL reached
over fifty percent market share, the FCO did not find the merger to be
anticompetitive in the sense of ARC section 24(1). It was found that the
product was relatively homogeneous and technically simple, that the
market had been strongly competitive for many years and that there were
other potent competitors on the market including such worldwide selling
manufacturers as ASEA (Sweden) and Alsthom (France). That the domestic market shares of these manufacturers were relatively small was
attributed to the fact that prices in Germany, as a result of hard competition, were relatively low as compared with foreign markets so that foreign suppliers were not particularly interested in expanding their sales
activities in Germany. Actual and potential competition by the other
domestic and foreign suppliers was regarded as sufficiently strong to exclude dominant market power of Siemens after the merger with GL.
An illustration that the FCO uses the same approach'also in "oligopoly" cases covered by the presumption of section 23a(2) is the 1986
merger between Olivetti and TA Triumph-Adler AG, previously owned
by Volkswagen AG. 4 6 The FCO investigation in this case centered on

the domestic market for typewriters, including electronic typewriters, accounting for 87% of all typewriter sales in Germany in 1985. The domestic market shares of the leading sellers in 1985 were: TA and
Olympia AG (a subsidiary of AEG-Daimler-Benz AG) each approximately 28%, IBM and Olivetti each approximately 10%, Brother nearly
7% and Canon slightly under 3%. In holding that the competitive conditions on the relevant market justified the expectation of substantial
competition for the time after the merger and that the presumption of
market dominating "oligopoly" power under section 23a(2) was thereby
rebutted, the FCO relied largely on the competitive strength of Japanese
suppliers such as Brother and Canon which had entered the German
market only a few years earlier and had since then engaged in active
45. BUNDESKARTELLAMT, 1983/84 TATIGKEITBERICHT 80-81 (1985) (BT DRUCKSACHE 10/
3550). A further example of "upgrading" small market shares of foreign suppliers is the merger case
between Krupp and Werner & Pfleiderer, reported in BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 25, at 7.
(See appendix to this article).
46. BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 25, at 70-71.
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price and quality competition. The fact that the EC Commission had
only recently imposed antidumping tariffs on imported Japanese typewriters was not regarded by the FCO as a high barrier to competition by
Japanese suppliers, since several of these suppliers, including Brother,
already manufactured in Europe and the tariffs were relatively modest.
The three cases just described, although reflecting in my opinion the
general trend in German merger control practice, should, however, not
be misinterpreted as if there were no reason for criticism at all. But the
critical aspects of this practice appear to relate more to general features
of the German system than to the special situation of applying it to mergers in an international trade context discussed in this article. The following remarks on German merger control practice in general can therefore
be limited to what appear to be, from a practical point of view, the central issues.
The application of the substantive law standard of section 24(1) of
the ARC can only be made on the basis of a prediction of the future
development of the market. Even where mergers already consummated
are involved, the question of whether the merger under review gives rise
to or strengthens dominant market power is not limited to the time prior
to the decision on the legality of the merger, but also includes future
market developments. 47 It is obvious that such predictions necessarily
involve a considerable risk of error. It can therefore be of no surprise
that in a number of cases decided by the FCO, former findings that a
merger will lead to dominant market power, or strengthen such power
where it already existed, could not be upheld in light of subsequent empirical evidence about actual market performance.
In two merger cases involving internationally traded products, the
FCO for this reason revoked earlier prohibitions of consummated mergers. In the case of the Thyssen-Hiiller merger, lawfully consummated in
1975, the FCO, after the merger had been notified under section 23(1) of
the ARC, issued a prohibition order on the basis of the resulting relatively high market shares (between 25% and 30%) combined with Thyssen's financial power. 48 The Berlin Court of Appeals affirmed this
47. Since the extension, by the 1980 ARC amendment, of the criteria for compulsory notification, about two-thirds of all cases falling under substantive merger control law are premerger notifications under the ARC § 24a(l). Since the smaller mergers, not subject to the statutory premerger
notification requirements, have to be notified only immediately after their consummation and may be
prohibited only within the first year after the notification was duly filed, the FCO can normally not
base its decision on a relatively long post-merger observation period. This period may, however, be
substantially longer in appeal cases, see supra note 32, or in cases with subsequent divestiture proceedings as in the Thyssen-Hiller case, see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
48. Order of Dec. 17, 1976, Bundeskartellamt, W. Ger., WuW/E [BKartA] 1657 (RheinstahlHiller). The merger was brought about by Thyssen-Industrie AG (then Rheinstahl AG), an affiliate
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order. 49 Meanwhile Thyssen had obtained a ministerial exemption under
section 24(3), limited, however, to a 45% interest in the company formed
as a result of the merger. 50 Under an agreement with the FCO the remaining 55% was to be sold to third parties by the end of 1984. In that
year a second investigation of the two relevant markets showed that
Thyssen's market-position, mainly as a result of increased sales by foreign suppliers, had weakened rather than, as predicted in 1976/77,
grown stronger. The FCO thereupon no longer insisted on the agreed
51
divestiture and the case was terminated.
A similar example is the case of the partly consummated merger
between Kl6ckner and Seitz-Enzinger-Noll (SEN) prohibited by the
FCO in 1984.52 After an unsuccessful attempt by the merging firms to
obtain a ministerial exemption, a new investigation of the market by the
FCO in the course of the ensuing divestiture proceedings showed substantial advances by competitors, especially by the Italian supplier
Simonazzi, reducing the market shares of the merging firms to below fifty
percent. Since in the FCO's opinion these firms could no longer be regarded as having dominant market power, it no longer upheld its request
53
for divestiture and the case was terminated.
of the Thyssen group, acquiring all of the capital of Karl Hiiller GmbH and merging this company
with its Hille division into a new company: Hiiller-Hille GmbH. The main relevant product market
involved was numeric controlled metal processing centers.
49. Judgment of Feb. 7, 1978, Kammergericht, W. Ger., WuW/E [OLG] 1921 (ThyssenHiiller) [hereinafter Thyssen-Huller]. The Court of Appeals in calculating the market shares of the
various suppliers included such foreign competitors as Olivetti, Kearney and Cincinnati. Japanese
firms at that time did not yet sell in Germany.
50. Decision of Aug. 1, 1977, Bundesminister fir Wirtschaft, W. Ger., WuW/E [BWM] 159
(Thyssen-Hiller). The reason for granting the exemption was the public interest in preventing
Hiller, a technologically leading firm, from being dissolved in a bankruptcy proceeding. The question of an alternative buyer at the time of the takeover of Hiller by Thyssen was not further explored. An appeal by Thyssen of the limitation of the exemption to a 45% interest was rejected by
the Court of Appeals. Thyssen-Huller, supra note 49, at 1973.
51. See BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 45, at 75. The FCO in stating its reasons for terminating the case also pointed to the Supreme Court's 1980 decision in the Klrckner-Bercorit case
where the Court had emphasized that market share data had only a limited relevance to the finding
of market power. Klrckner-Bercorit,supra note 31. For a critical, but in my opinion, overly onesided and factually inaccurate description and comment of the case, see Oliver, supra note 8, at 3335. Contrary to Oliver's assertion, international competition, to the extent it was ascertainable, was
taken into account in all stages of the case.
52. Order of Oct. 10, 1984, Bundeskartellamt, W. Ger., WuW/E [BKartA] 2178 (KlocknerSeitz). Klockner had only acquired a little less than 25% of SEN capital. Twenty-six percent was
bought by a bank. But since the FCO regarded this bank as Klockner's fiduciary, it took the view
that Klockner had acquired a majority interest in SEN. The relevant markets in the case were
cleaning and filling machines for beer and soft-drink bottles. Holstein & Kappert, a Klockner subsidiary, and SEN were found to be the two leading suppliers with an aggregated market share of up
to 70%. Both firms exported most of their products to foreign countries.
53. See BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 25, at 58. The pending appeal against the prohibition order of the FCO became obsolete by the outcome of this case.
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The need to adapt the application of merger control law to changing
market conditions, including increased foreign competition, can also be
seen from two merger cases involving the German automobile components manufacturer Sachs. In 1976 the FCO prohibited the proposed
acquisition of Sachs by the British firm Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds
(GKN) on the grounds that the dominant position of Sachs as the leading supplier of automobile clutches to domestic car manufacturers would
have been strengthened by the merger. 54 While the Court of Appeals
reversed the FCO order for lack of evidence that Sachs' market position
would be "entrenched," 5 5 the Federal Supreme Court reversed and upheld this order, reasoning that the evidence in the case was sufficient to
assume such "entrenchment. ' 56 GKN thereupon dropped its merger
plan. However, in 1987 the FCO gave clearance to the proposed acquisition of Sachs by Mannesmann. 5 7 After conducting a new investigation of
the market, the FCO had found that, since 1975, the other domestic
manufacturer LuK had substantially increased its market share at the
expense of Sachs and that suppliers from France and Italy had meanwhile entered the German market and achieved significant sales volumes.
The reason for this change of the market situation was largely seen in
modifications of the buying strategy of the German automobile industry
which had formerly given less attention to "double-sourcing" purchase
and also largely followed a policy of "at-home buying."
Examples of such prediction "errors" as in the three cases just described are inherent to any system of pre-merger control, unless one accepts that, to exclude any risk of error, the application of merger law in
effect never leads to the prohibition of a merger. But neither such a
"zero option," nor the substitution of pre-merger control by a system
whereunder the legality of mergers would be examined only after their
consummation so that the effects on competition could be empirically
verified during a sufficiently long "testing period," seem to be satisfactory
alternatives. On the contrary, the enormous practical difficulties in dis54. Order of May 12, 1976, Bundeskartellamt, W. Ger., WuW/E [BKartA] 1625 (GKNSachs). Consummation of the merger was automatically stayed as a result of the FCO order pending
appeal proceedings.
55. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1976, Kammergericht, W. Ger., WuW/E [OLG] 1745 (Sachs).
56. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1978, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., WuW/E [BGH] 1501 (Kfz-Kupplungen). Although GKN manufactured automobile clutches in the United Kingdom, it was not
regarded as a potential competitor in Germany, since it had withdrawn from that market only a few
years earlier by selling its German production facilities to a third party. Increase of market power
by lessening potential competition could therefore not be relied on by the courts as an additional
reason for finding the merger to be anticompetitive.
57. To be reported in the 1987/1988 FCO Activity Report (forthcoming).
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solving mergers years after their consummation 8 caused the German antitrust legislature in 1980 to expand the scope of compulsory pre-merger
control although it was obviously fully aware of the unavoidable risk of
prediction "errors." The central question therefore is not whether such
"errors" have in fact occurred, but whether through shaping statutory
law and its enforcement, the risk of error can be kept within reasonable
limits. Only the following two aspects of this question can be briefly
taken up in this article: (1) the degree of "structuralism," i.e. reliance on
market structure criteria such as market shares rather than on past competitive conduct of the firms on the market as a basis for predicting how
the merger will affect the future operation of competition on the market;
and (2) the practical methods for identifying and weighing potential competition by foreign suppliers.
A pre-merger control system as applied in Germany, which requires
a final decision on the legality of a merger before it is consummated, can
only be based on a primarily "structuralist" approach. This applies especially where, as in section 24(1) of the ARC, the legal standard for identifying anticompetitive mergers is the structural aspect of dominant
market power rather than the conduct aspect of lessening competitive
activity on the market. While the extended use of market structure criteria and structure based presumptions in German merger law is thus only
logical, special care is needed to ensure that such a "structuralism" remains sufficiently realistic and dynamic, taking into account in particular
the fact that there is no strict correlation between market structure and
market conduct.
In a recent analysis of German merger control law enforcement
practice under this aspect, I reached the conclusion that in accordance
with the guidelines laid down in the Kl6ckner-Becorit judgment of the
Federal Supreme Court, 59 this practice may be generally characterized as
reflecting a "realistic, market-oriented structuralism" under the motto
"structure approach as far as possible---conduct approach as far as necessary." 6 But I also noted that in several of the cases where mergers were
challenged by the FCO or the courts as anticompetitive, the structure
approach appeared to be overly rigid and static. 6 1 This critical aspect
58. For a detailed analysis of German experience with the dissolution of prohibited consummated mergers and of the complex legal problems presented by such cases, see KERBER, DIE UNTERNEHMENSENTFLECHTUNG NACH DEM GWB (1987).
59. Klickner-Becorit, supra note 31, at 1754-55.
60. Markert, supra note 33, at 134.
61. See Markert, Die Praxis der Fusionskontrolle und der Missbrauchsaufsicht 1984/85, in
SCHWERPUNKTE DES KARTELLRECHTS 1984/1985 59, 72-73; Markert, Die Anwendung des GWB
auf den Lebensmittelhandel, in WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNG IN DER NACHFRANGE 61 (1985).
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would become even more important, if in the current discussion about
further amendments to the ARC 62 the legislature would take up such
proposals as extending the statutory market domination concept to situations of vertical dependence, 63 or aggravating the conditions for rebutting
the market share presumptions, 64 or submitting very large mergers to an
absolute size control system. 6 5 But at present no steps in that direction
appear to be likely. 66 It should also be said that the examples of a possibly exaggerated "structuralism" are mostly pure domestic cases including several mergers in food retailing. 67 In the international competition
In the latter article I have compared the FCO policy in relation to food trade mergers with the
-populist" attitude in the United States in the 1960s represented by such cases as Brown Shoe and
Von's Grocery. In the meantime the Berlin Court of Appeals, by its judgment in the CoopWandmaker case, reversing the FCO prohibition order, has brought about the necessary corrections.
Judgement of Nov. 5, 1986, Kammergericht, W. Ger., WuW/E [OLG] 3917 (Coop-Wandmaker)
[hereinafter Coop- Wandmaker].
62. In February 1989, the Cabinet submitted a draft bill to amend the ARC to the Federal
Parliament. The text of the bill is published in Regierungsentwurf eines Funften Gesetzes zur
Anderung des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen (1.2.1989), 39 WuW 209 (1989) [hereinafter Draft Bill]. For a critical analysis of the proposed amendments, see Markert, Brauchen wir eine
Kartellnovelle?, 38 WuW 181 (1988).
63. See, e.g., Ulmer, Brauchen wir eine Kartellgesetznovelle?, 1987 DerMarkenartikel 326, 33234. As to vertical dependency as a German antitrust law concept, see ARC § 26(2).
64. The main proposal in this context is to exclude, in the "qualified" oligopoly presumption of
§ 23a(2), the possibility to rebut, on intra-group competition grounds, the presumption in all cases
where consumer products with a very large market volume are involved. This proposal obviously
aims at a per se prohibition of mergers between the largest, nation-wide operating food retailing
enterprises, after the attempt to achieve this goal already on the basis of present law failed as a result
of the Court of Appeals decision in the Coop-Wandmaker case. Coop-Wandmaker, supra note 61.
65. The recent discussion about the introduction of stricter absolute size control criteria was
mainly caused by the merger between Daimler-Benz and AEG, making Daimler-Benz the largest
German enterprise with a turnover of over 70 billion DM in 1987. BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra
note 25, at 61-62. See, e.g., VI MONOPOLKOMMISSION, GESAMTWIRTSCHAFrLICHE CHANCEN UND
RISIKEN WACHSENDER UNTERNEHMENSGRbSSEN: HAUPTGUTACHTEN 1984/1985 184-92 (1986);
Immenga, Zusammenschlusse zwischen Grossunternehmen als Gegenstand des Rechts der
Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, in WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK UND WETrBEWERBSRECHT: ZUR DISKUSSION UM DIE NOVELLIERUNG DES GWB 185 (H. Helmrich ed. 1987). The Monopolies Commission
has also played, in my opinion, a hardly constructive role in criticizing the FCO for its allegedly too
soft policy in administering the presumptions of ARC §§ 22(3) & 23a.
66. .According to the administration bill of February 1, 1989, the only proposed change of
substantive merger law is to add, in the list of criteria to be considered for the finding of a superior
market position within the meaning of ARC § 22(1)2, the following two points: (1)the capability of
the firms involved to change over to other products or services; (2) the absence of another supply of
purchasing alternatives. See Draft Bill, supra note 62. This would not alter the basic approach
under this provision requiring an overall assessment of all relevant factors. See, e.g.,'supra note 32.
67. The latest example of a possibly too "structuralist" application of merger law is the case of
the merger between the two grain-milling enterprises, Kampffmeyer and Plange. The relevant geographic market in this case was northern Germany. The FCO prohibited the merger mainly on pure
market share and financial power grounds. See Order of Nov. 8, 1985, Bundeskartellamt, W. Ger.,
WuW/E [BKartA] 2223 (Kampffmeyer-Plange). The Berlin Court of Appeals affirmed this decision
without any consideration of whether, in view of the fact that the market before the merger was
highly competitive, a reduction of competition on the market as a result of the merger could be
expected. See Judgment of Dec. 16, 1987, Kammergericht, W. Ger., WuW/E [OLG] 4146
(Kampffmeyer-Plange). The Court of Appeals did not discuss whether its approach was consistent
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context discussed in this article they are therefore, at best, of minor rele-

6
vance only.

8

Within the moderately "structuralist" approach characterizing
merger law enforcement in Germany, all factors which may have an influence on competition on the market have to be taken into account in
assessing whether or not the merger under review is likely to be anticompetitive. Since such an influence may also be exerted by firms with no
actual sales on the relevant product and geographic market, competition
both by sellers of substitute products and by potential domestic and foreign competitors is a necessary part of merger analysis. Potential competition by suppliers which already sell the same product on foreign
markets is of course of particular importance in this context. As is illustrated by some of the cases described earlier in this article and by the
FCO policy statement in its 1985/86 Activity Report, 6 9 the principle of
including foreign potential competition is undisputed. But, as is also indicated in the FCO statement, the implementation of this principle is
facing considerable practical difficulties. The central question is obviously to find appropriate criteria for identifying foreign sources of supply
as competitive alternatives accessible to domestic buyers and for assessing their potential as a countervailing factor in relation to the possible
market power of the actual suppliers on the market.
In dealing with geographic market definition, I already underlined
the enormous difficulties frequently confronting antitrust authorities and
national courts in attempting to obtain reliable information on foreign
enterprises. This is true not only for data relating to sales in territories of
other countries and to foreign production capacities, but especially to
information about the entrepreneurial strategy of foreign firms as a basis
for assessing whether, having sufficient capability and incentive to enter
the domestic market, such firs may be regarded as influential potential
competitors. This assessment is further aggravated by the uncertainties
of international trade relations and foreign exchange rates, 70 factors
which obviously determine to a large extent the possibilities of foreign
firms to enter the domestic market. Where the firms to be assessed under
this aspect are already active in domestic territory-as suppliers of other,
with the Federal Supreme Court's decision in the Klckner-Becorit case. See Klockner-Becorit, supra
note 31. The Federal Supreme Court has meanwhile affirmed the Court of Appeals judgment.
68. Of course, should merger law in Germany generally move in the direction of a stricter
"structuralism," its hitherto rather flexible application to mergers with a major international competition dimension could probably no longer be fully maintained.
69. See appendix to this article.
70. See, e.g., Calvani, The Uncertainties of InternationalGeographicMarkets, WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV., Feb. 1988, at 93, also discussing other U.S. literature on the subject.
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possibly related, products or of smaller quantities of the relevant product-direct contacts with the domestic representatives of these firms can
frequently clarify the reasons why sales of the relevant product to domestic buyers were either small or not taking place at all. 71 Commercial

domestic buyers following an international buying strategy, such as most
industrial buyers of raw materials, semi-finishes, manufacturing equipment, and components, or large trading enterprises such as supermarket
chains, department store enterprises or mailorder houses, are also often
in a position to provide reliable information about whether a particular
foreign firm may be expected to enter the domestic market in a foreseeable future or, if it is already in that market, what its competitive perspective is likely to be. Finally, where foreign firms, as demonstrated by
many Japanese suppliers of electronics products, have already, by aggressive competition, penetrated the domestic market with similar products,
there is normally good reason to expect that they will follow the same
strategy as to other products as well, unless special circumstances such as
72
import restrictions prevent them from doing so.

The uncertainties of international trade policy and foreign exchange
rates are primarily a problem affecting non-European firms. Inside the
EEC, and to a large extent also in regard to the other western European
countries having association agreements with the EEC, public and private trade barriers have lost a great deal of their former importance, and
the uncertainties of foreign exchange rates have been substantially re73
duced by the European Monetary System. The Single European Act
and the measures taken in the course of its implementation are further
accelerating the process of abolishing trade barriers within the EEC. As
a general rule, suppliers from other EEC member states and to a large
extent also from other western European countries are therefore more
likely to be considered as potential competitors in Germany than overseas firms. On the other hand, in particular cases the competitive potential of such firms may well turn out to be by far greater than that of
neighboring European suppliers.
All of this calls for a careful case-by-case approach to the problem
of foreign potential competition in merger analysis, avoiding extremist
solutions in both directions. It is also not permissible to ignore this problem for reasons either of insufficient sources of information regarding the
71. See, e.g., supra note 45 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., supra note 46 and accompanying text. Other examples are several merger cases
involving domestic consumer electronics products manufacturers. See BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra
note 45, at 79.
73. See Signing of the Single European Act, supra note 3.
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activities of firms not present on domestic territory or of the uncertainties
of international trade relations including foreign exchange rates. Nor
can, as frequently demanded by businessmen and the antitrust bar, every
foreign supplier of internationally traded products be automatically regarded as a highly influential potential competitor on the domestic market. The latter approach, as a long-run perspective, appears to be feasible
only inside the EEC, provided the goal of the Single European Act to
create a fully integrated internal market can be essentially achieved. I
doubt whether in German merger control practice the time has already
come to accept, under international competition aspects, a merger of the
two main domestic manufacturers of automotive bearings with a combined market share of ninety-four percent, as the British Office of Fair
Trading has recently done under British merger law.7 4 Of course, where
strong domestic commercial buyers with expertise in international
purchasing, such as large automobile manufacturers, can easily turn to
fully competitive foreign suppliers, but prefer to "buy national," it is
hard to see why they should be protected by merger law against high
domestic seller concentration. Nor are private consumers' preferences
for national suppliers, if they cannot be explained by such "rational"
grounds as better price, quality, or after-sale service, an entirely convincing reason for such protection. The crucial question of any merger control system, namely "how much concentration is too much?,",is in such
situations as difficult to answer as in many purely domestic cases. What
is certain, however, is that the "too much" verdict will become rarer as
international competition makes further progress.
III.

INFLUENCE OF EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL LAW

Of the three treaties establishing European communities for coal
and steel,7 5 atomic anergy 7 6 and all other economic activities 77 only the
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC
Treaty), contains special provisions on the control of the anticompetitive
effects of mergers. Under article 66 mergers of firms engaged in business
activities falling under the ECSC Treaty 78 are subject to prior authorization by the EC Commission,7 9 if the merging firms reach or pass the size
74. 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 865 (1988).
75. ECSC Treaty, supra note 10.
76. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 167.
77. EEC Treaty, supra note 6, as amended by the Single European Act of February 28, 1986,
supra note 3.
78. See the definition in Annex I of the ECSC Treaty. ECSC Treaty, supra note 10, at 229-32.
79. As a result of the Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the
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criteria fixed by the Commission under article 66(3).1 0 The Commission
has to authorize the merger if it finds that the merger in question will not
give the participating firms "the power to determine prices to control or
restrict production or distribution, or to prevent the maintenance of effective competition in a substantial part of the market for such products;
or to evade the rules of competition as they result from the execution of
this Treaty, in particular by establishing an artificially privileged position
involving a substantial advantage in access to supplies or markets."
There is no exemption clause for cases where the Commission finds that
a merger has such anticompetitive effects.
It is a long settled question that the control of mergers under article
66 of the ECSC Treaty is exclusive in the sense that the national merger
control laws of the member states do not apply. This is reflected in section 101 No. 3 of the ARC which states that the Act shall not apply to
the extent the ESCS Treaty contains special provisions. While community law has absolute priority over national merger control law where
there is overlap, the latter remains fully applicable insofar as the merger
under review involves products not covered by the ECSC Treaty. The
concurrent applicability of both bodies of merger control law in "mixed"
merger cases was confirmed in the German Federal Supreme Court's decision in the Sachs-GKN merger case, 8 1 where the court held that authorizations granted under article 66 of the ECSC Treaty do not prevent
German authorities and courts from challenging the same merger under
German merger control law, if it has anticompetitive effects on domestic
product markets other than coal and steel products covered by the ECSC
82
Treaty. The EC Commission has taken the same stand on this issue. It
is generally accepted in German merger control practice that the applicability of German merger control law to "mixed" coal and steel merger
cases not only includes the power to challenge mergers under ARC section 24(1), but also the notification requirements of sections 23(1) and
24a(l) and the waiting periods in section 24a(4). 83 Because in reality all
European Communities (Merger Treaty), the EC Commission has the powers of the High Authority
within the meaning of the ECSC Treaty. Trait Instituant un Conseil Unique et une Comission
Unigve des CommunautisEuropiennes, 10 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTIS EUROPItENNES
(No. L 152) 2 (1967.).
80. See ECSC regulations 25/54, 25/67 & 2495/78, compiled in 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
285) 2 (1978).
81. See supra note 55.
82. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SIXTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 63-64 (1977).
83. A recent example i the case of the merger between the two leading German coal mining
enterprises: Ruhrkohle AG and Eschweiler Bergwerks-Verein AG. Since both firms also have activities in areas other than coal, notice of the merger was also given under German merger control law
to the Federal Cartel Office which granted clearance. The EC Commission in December 1988 authorized the merger under article 66 of the ECSC Treaty.
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German coal and steel manufacturing and trading enterprises are also
active in other fields, "double" merger control both under ECSC and
German law in coal and steel merger cases is current practice.
In contrast to what applies under the ECSC Treaty, the law on
mergers under the EEC Treaty is much more complicated both as to its
content and to its relationship to the national merger control laws in the
member states.8 4 Although the antitrust provisions of the EEC Treaty
contained in articles 85 and 86 do not refer to mergers at all, the European Court of Justice in two judgments declared both provisions to be
85
applicable in merger cases. In its judgment in the ContinentalCan case
the Court held that a merger may violate article 86 which prohibits abuse
of a dominant position, if a dominant firm, as a result of a merger,
strengthens its position "to the point where the degree of domination
achieved substantially hampered competition, so that only enterprises
which in their market conduct are dependent on the dominant enterprise
would remain on the market."'8 6 This Continental Can doctrine has,
however, only a very limited practical relevance, as is already indicated
87
by the fact that no mergers were as yet prohibited on this basis.
Meanwhile, the court in Philip Morris-Rothmans88 held that mergers by acquisition of an equity interest in another enterprise may also be
covered by article 85 prohibiting restrictive agreements, where "the investing company obtains legal or de facto control of the commercial conduct of the other company or where the agreement provides for
commercial cooperation between the companies or creates a structure
likely to be used for such cooperation." 89 The impact of this holding is
rather unclear. Although the facts of the case and the confirmation by
the Court of the EC Commission's denial of a violation of article 85 suggest a narrow interpretation, some commentators have gone much further, 90 in one case even including purchases on the stock exchange. 91 If,
however, the transaction underlying the Court's judgment is regarded as
the formation of a joint venture, the Court's holding appears much less
84. Such laws exist at present in France, Germany, Ireland and in the United Kingdom.
85. See Continental Can Case, supra note 10.
86. Id. at 8300.
87. Examples of merger cases examined by the EC Commission under article 86 are reported in
the EC annual reports on competition policy.
88. Supra note 10.
89. Id. at 17,762 (emphasis omitted).
90. See, e.g., Satzky, Fusionskontrolle nach Art. 85 EWGV-Vertrag, 41 DER BETRIEB 379
(1988). For a much narrower interpretation, see Riesenkampff, Auswirkungen des Urteils des EuGH
vom 1711.1988 ("Philip Morris"), 38 WuW 465 (1988); Immenga & Fuchs, Art. 85 EWG-Vertrag
als Grenzeftir Unternehmensbeteiligungen?,48 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3052 (1988).
91. Schodermeier, Aufdem Weg zur europdischen Fusionskontrolle, 38 WuW 185 (1988).
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dramatic, given the fact that it is long established EEC practice that joint
venture agreements between actual or potential competitors are treated
as being covered by article 85.92
Like the scope of application of articles 85 and 86 to mergers, the
relationship between these articles and the national antitrust laws of the
member states in cases of overlap is also unclear. In contrast to what
applies to coal and steel products covered by the ECSC Treaty, there are
no national law provisions, as in ARC section 101 No. 3, to the effect
that community law, where applicable, shall exclude the application of
national law. The European Court of Justice in its judgment of February
13th, 1969 in the Dyestuff case 93 acknowledged the principle already expressed in the Treaty itself, (article 87(2)(e) that ECC and national antitrust law apply concurrently, but added that the application of national
antitrust law in the same case may not "jeopardize the uniform application throughout the Common Market of the Community cartel rules or
the full effect of the measures taken under such rules." In a later judgment, 94 the Court held that informal negative clearances issued by the
EC Commission ("comfort letters") stating that the Commission sees no
reason for intervention under articles 85 and 86, do not prevent national
authorities and courts from applying national antitrust law prohibition to
the same facts. 95
While it is clear from these two judgments that prohibition orders
under EEC law in merger cases have priority over clearances given under
national merger control law and that formal and informal negative clearances by the EC Commission do not prevent the member states from
prohibiting the same merger under their own laws, the effect of exemptions granted by the EC-Commission under article 85(3) on the power of
the member states to prohibit mergers under their merger control laws is
still an unsettled question. The Court in the Dyestuff case 96 merely noted
92. For recent examples of EC Commission practice, see Commission Decision of 5 May 1988,
31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 150) 35 (1988); Commission Decision of 22 December 1987, 31 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 50) 18 (1988).

93. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8056, at 7856 (Feb. 13, 1969). For a detailed description of this case, see Markert, The Dyestuff
Case.- A Contribution to the Relationship Between the Antitrust Laws of the European Economic
Community and Its Member States, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 869 (1969). See generally II B. HAWK,
UNITED STATES,

COMMON MARKET AND

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST,

35-38 (2d ed.

1986);

Stockmann, EEC Competition Law and Member States Competition Laws, in FORDHAM CORP. LAW
INSTITUTES: NORTH AMERICAN AND COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST AND TRADE LAWS 265, 28083 (B. Hawk ed. 1988).
94. Procureur de la Rhpublique v. Bruno Giry, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep
(CCH) 8712, at 8512 (July 10, 1980).

95. Id. at 8542-43.
96.

Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, supra note 93.
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that the EEC Treaty "also enables the Community authorities to exercise
some positive, albeit indirect, action, in order to promote a harmonious
development of economic activities throughout the Community, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty." 9 7 Most commentators have interpreted this wording as the court's attempt to attribute, at least to
individual exemptions under article 85(3), priority over national antitrust
law in the sense that no action under this law may be taken which would
have the effect of making the exempted practice impossible. 98 While
many commentators go even further and would include all block exemptions, 99 others take a much narrower view,°° some even upholding the
"double barrier" theory under which community law exemptions are
without any effect on the applicability of national antitrust law. 10 1
This unsettled question of the relationship between EEC and national antitrust law is an important reason why the attempt by the EC
Commission to persuade the Council of Ministers to pass, by a unanimous decision under article 235 of the EEC Treaty, a regulation establishing within the EEC a European merger control system, has so far
been unsuccessful. The Commission's first draft of such a regulation already dates back to 1973.102 After no action on this draft had been taken
by the Council, the Commission in 1988 presented an entirely revised
new draft. 0 3 Under the new text, all mergers of a "Community dimension" 10 4 would be subject to a compulsory advance clearance procedure
97. Id. at 7866.
98. For a detailed discussion, see, e.g., Schr6ter, Vorbernerkung zu den Artikeln 85 bis 89, in
KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG 878, 921-25 (H. von der Groeben, H. von Boeckh, J. Thiesing
& C.D. Ehlermann eds., 3d ed. 1983); Stockmann, supra note 93, at 286-94.
99. See, e.g., Lieberknecht, Das Verhdltnis der EG-Gruppenfreistellungverordnungen zum deutschen Kartellrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR GERD PFEIFFER supra note 25, at 589.
100.

See, e.g., KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ GEGEN WETTBEWERBSBESCHRANKUNGEN 48-55 (U.

Immenga & E.J. Mestmiicker eds. 1981); Markert, supra note 93 at 886-94.
101. See in particular Schr6ter, Vorbemerkung zu Art. 85, par. 36-52, in KOMMENTAR ZUM
EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 98, at 922 n.25. Koch is the "inventor" of the "double barrier" theory.
See Koch, Das Verhitnis der Kartellvorschriften des E WG- Vertrages zum Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen, 14 BB 241 (1959).
102. See Markert, supra note 10.
103. Merger Regulation, supra note 10.
104. Mergers are generally defined in article 3(1) as acquisition of "direct or indirect control of
the whole or parts of one or more undertakings." Id. at 6.
"Community dimension" is defined in article l(2)(a) as:
where at least two of the undertakings effecting the concentration have their principal field
of Community activities in a different member State; or (b) where the undertakings effecting the concentration have their principal field of Community activities in one and the
same Member State, but where at least one of them has substantial operations in other
Member States in particular through subsidiaries or direct sales.

Id. at 5.
Article l(3)(a) provides, however, that a merger does not have such a dimension,
where the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is less than 1000
million ECU; or (b) where the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings con-
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by the EC Commission. Article 2(2) provides that such mergers are incompatible with the common market, "where they give rise to or
strengthen a dominant position in the common market or a substantial
part thereof."' 0 5
Mergers having this effect Would, however, have to be authorized by
the Commission under article 2(4),
where they contribute to the attainment of the basic objectives of the
Treaty, in particular to improving the production and distribution, to
promoting technical or economic progress or to improving the competitive structure within the common market, taking due account of the
competitiveness of the undertakings concerned with regard to international competition and of the interests of consumers, provided that
they .do not (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the achievement of the concentration,
(b) do not afford the undertakings concerned the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the goods or services concerned.
Article 19(3) further provides that mergers shall be considered to have
been authorized, if the Commission has not issued a prohibition order
under Article 2(2) within a period of four months following the date of
commencement of the proceedings, unless the participating firms agree to
extend that period.106

Compared with German merger law, the European control system
proposed in the EC Commission's 1988 draft seems to be based on the
same substantive standard of market domination. But since this term is
not specified in the draft by definitions and presumptions as in German
law in ARC sections 22(1)-(3) and 23a, it is doubtful whether the market
domination standard laid down in article 2(2) of the Commission's draft
would extend as far as the corresponding standard in ARC section 24(1),
07
for example as regards the inclusion of market dominating oligopolies.
cerned exceeds 1000 million ECU, but where the aggregate worldwide turnover of the
undertaking to be acquired is less than 50 million ECU; or (c) where all the undertakings
effecting the concentration achieve more than three-quarters of their aggregate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member state.
Id. at 6.
105. As to the term "dominant position," see article 86 of the EEC Treaty as interpreted by
several judgments of the European Court of Justice. See, e.g., Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v.
Commission of the Eur. Comm., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8527 at
7503, 7540-59 (Feb. 13, 1979); II B. HAWK, supra note 93. Article 2(3) of the draft merger regulation provides for a presumption of compatibility "with the common market where the market-share
of the [participating firms] in the common market or in a substantial part thereof is less than 20%."
Merger Regulation, supra note 10, at 6.
106. Under article 6(5) the Commission loses its power to challenge a merger on grounds of
article 2(2), if it has not commenced proceedings within two months after the notification of the
merger was made, unless the participating firms agree to an extension of that period or have supplied
false or misleading information in the notification. Merger Regulation, supra note 10, at 7-8.
107. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, the EEC draft is stricter in the sense that it subjects
all relevant mergers to compulsory advance clearance. The critical point
of the EEC draft as compared with German law is the broad power of
the EC Commission under article 2(4) to authorize anticompetitive
mergers on public policy grounds. Since any "contribution to the attainment of the basic objectives of the Treaty" is sufficient, the Commission's
exemption power would be limited only by clause (b) excluding authorization where the firms involved achieve the power to eliminate competition. Thus only "monopolistic" mergers would not qualify for an
authorization. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that there
is no institutional division, as in Germany, between the assessment of the
effects of the merger on competition and the decision whether there are
overriding public policy reasons justifying an exemption. But even more
questionable is the "fictitious" authorization provided for in article 19(3)
of the draft. As a result, public policy exemptions could be granted without stating any reason for it, including cases where such grounds were
perhaps not even asserted by the merging firms. In view of the very limited time the Commission has under the draft for rendering a formal
decision, normally not more than six months after notification was
made, and the enormous administrative problems involved in the Commission's decision-making process,10 8 the danger that article 19(3) may
determine the outcome in many big merger cases is no mere hypothesis.
As long as these problems raised by the present text of the Commission's draft are not solved in a satisfactory, competition-oriented manner,
the idea that new European merger control system shall have full priority
over national merger control law does not appear acceptable. The Commission's draft, in number 23 of its introductory reasons, contains only
an indirect reference to this issue by stating as one of its goals, "to avoid
concurrent proceedings." It is no secret, however, that the Commission's
draft rests on the premise that, based upon the prevailing interpretation
of what the Court of Justice in the Dyestuff case referred to as "positive
action," 10 9 all mergers authorized by the Commission under article 2(4),
including "fictitious" authorizations under article 19(3), are to be immune from national merger law. Arguing that "double" control of mergers in the EEC should be avoided entirely, the business communityI 10
108. See Graupner, Commission Decision-Making on Competition Questions, 10 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 291 (1973); Van Bael, E.E.C. Antitrust Enforcement and Adjudication as Seen by Defense Counsel, Swiss REV. INT'L ANTITRUST L., Sept. 1979, at 1.

109. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
110. See UNICE press release of May 4, 1988 and the advisory opinion of the Economic and
Social Council of the EC on the Commission's 1988 draft of June 2, 1988, Opinion on the Amended
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and private antitrust practitioners"'I go even much further and demand
that all mergers within the scope of the EEC merger regulation, irrespective of their effects on particular national markets, shall be exclusively
covered by EEC law. This solution would correspond to what already
applies in regard to the merger control law of the ECSC Treaty. On the
basis of estimations that under the present text of the Commission's draft
between 200 and 300 merger cases a year would fall under the new European control system, "exclusivity" in relation to national merger control
law would undoubtedly amount to a dramatic reduction of the present
role of German antitrust law as a merger control instrument.
In an earlier analysis of the Commission's 1973 draft,' 1 2 I pointed
out that "in view of the high degree of concentration already reached in a
number of important industries in the Common Market and the continuing wave of mergers, such powers (to control mergers) are necessary to
an active Community competition policy." Today, fifteen years later, in
spite of the enlargement of the EEC by three new members and the much
higher degree of internationalization of markets reached in the
meantime, there is even more of a need for an effective European merger
control system, especially in view of the goal to achieve an internal European market by the end of 1992. I also expressed, however, the view that
"without a properly equipped and organized administrative machinery
the proposed merger control risks becoming a bureaucratic farce which
would discredit the name of competition and place unnecessary burdens
13
on merger candidates."'
14
Federalism in the EEC even after 1992 will still be incomplete.
Attributing "exclusivity" to "federal" merger control law in relation to
state law is therefore, in the European context, still much less self-evident
than in present United States antitrust law." 5 It would be absurd if the
introduction of a "federal" law on merger control in Europe, by eliminating at the same time well-functioning national control systems such as
the German one, resulted in weakening instead of strengthening the polProposalfor a Council Regulation (EEC)on the Control of ConcentrationsBetween Undertakings,31
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 208) 12 (1988).

111. See, e.g., Riesenkampff, supra note 90.
112. Markert, supra note 10, at 139.
113. Markert, EEC Competition Policy Towards Mergers, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE UK
AND EEC 67 (K. George & C. Joll eds. 1975).
114. See Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: Jurisdiction over Antitrust Matters in the European
Economic Community, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1964).
115. See, e.g., California ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) I
68,288, 59,650-61 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal
Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375 (1983); Oliver, Federal and State Antitrust Enforcement: Constitutional
Principles and Policy Considerations,9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245 (1988).
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icy against the anticompetitive effects of mergers. That there is a real
danger may be seen from the almost enthusiastic reaction of the German
Federation of Industries to the Commission's proposal 1 6 which radically
contrasts its decidedly negative attitude vis-A-vis German merger control.
I can therefore, in conclusion, only repeat what I wrote in 1969: "What is
needed in the Common Market is not a centralized but powerless antitrust system that may perhaps be closer to the ideal of the 'purist' adherents of the supremacy of Community law, but a dual system of both
Community and national antitrust law and coordinated cooperation by
11 7
Community and national authorities." '
IV.

CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to demonstrate the impact of the growing
internationalization of markets on antitrust law by focusing on merger
control law in the Federal Republic of Germany. This law is a particularly illustrative example of this impact both in general terms and in the
particular context of progressing market integration in Europe and the
present efforts by the European Economic Community to introduce a
European system of merger control. In accordance with the central position of merger control in antitrust law and its especially "political" nature, it is no surprise to observe that the antitrust law and policy
problems resulting from market internationalization under both aspects
are primarily arising in connection with merger policy.
Undoubtedly, the most far-reaching effects of this development on
the future role of antitrust law in Germany could be brought about by
the introduction of a new European merger control system. This will
depend on how broad a scope the EC Council and eventually the Court
of Justice decide to give to this control and on its relationship to the
national merger control laws of the member states. It may well be that in
the very long run the role of these laws is approaching that of the merger
control provisions in many state antitrust laws in the United
States. But
to be acceptable, this perspective presupposes a fully developed and effectively operating "federal" merger control system in Europe. Overstretched "exclusivity" models in favor of community law as are
presently envisaged by many, including the EC Commission, can under
present conditions, only create an unreasonable risk of reducing effective
merger control in Europe rather than reinforcing it.
Of course, any EC merger control system, even one limited to pres116. See supra note 105.
117. Markert, supra note 93, at 893.
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ent law under article 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty and article 66 of the
ECSC Treaty, would also have to cope with the general consequences of
market internationalization. As far as German merger law is concerned,
it appears to be sufficiently flexible to take account of any increase of
competitive alternatives as a result of better accessibility of many foreign
suppliers to the domestic market. The crucial problem in this context is
not geographic market definition as a "technical" question, but rather the
development, as a practical matter, of operational criteria and procedures
for assessing the real impact of foreign suppliers on the domestic competitive situation. Here also, the danger of going too far and arriving at
overly simplistic solutions is evident. Antitrust legislators and law enforcement institutions should therefore advance in this field only with a
special degree of realism and prudence.
Whether the various national merger control laws in the world and
possibly also a future EEC merger law are, in the long run, an adequate
basis to deal with the antitrust problems of business concentration in a
wider, perhaps even global international context, is another question. In
spite of all legal and practical flexibility these laws may have in relation
to international and foreign mergers, their scope is necessarily limited to
the effects of such mergers on the territory in which the respective law
applies. To deal with the wider concentration issues would require, in
whatever context, a true system of international antitrust control. But
such a system will remain a pure vision still for a very long time. In an
earlier study118 I therefore pointed out that the need for more international coordination of national and EC antitrust law enforcement also
extends to merger control, even though this part of antitrust law, because
of its highly "political" nature and the weight of national governments'
interests involved in many merger cases, presents the greatest difficulties
in trying to find agreed solutions in particular cases. In the meantime
not very much progress has been made. But in the absence of any other
alternative, the difficult path to more international cooperation must still
be pursued.
ADDENDUM

In regard to the plan to introduce a European merger control system discussed in more detail in part III, new important developments
have taken place since the completion of the manuscript in June 1988
which also have considerable relevance in the present context.
At the end of 1988 the adoption by the EC Council of Ministers of a
118. Markert, Merger Control, supra note 7, at 319-20.
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regulation on merger control as part of EEC competition law was still
uncertain. The attempt by the Commission to achieve adoption by submitting, in November 1988, a completely revised draft, 1 9 replacing its
earlier draft of February 1988, was not successful. The Council meeting
on December 21, 1988, showed substantial differences among states as to
the coverage of the proposed regulation and also as to its relationship
with the national merger control laws existing in several member

states. 120
The new draft of the Commission further exacerbated the latter
problem in two respects: first, by providing in article 20 (2) that "Member States shall not apply their national legislation on competition to concentrations having a Community dimension, unless expressly empowered
by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of the last sentence
of Article 8(2)," and second, by providing in article 8(2) for a formal
decision by the Commission also in those cases where the merger under
review is found to have no anticompetitive effects as defined in article
2(2).121 Quite obviously, such decisions merely declaring the merger to
be "compatible with the common market" are designed to provide the
legal basis for the exclusion of national merger control law as provided in
article 20(2) on the premise that they also are to be regarded as a "positive action" within the meaning of the Dyestuff judgment of the European Court of Justice. 122 As a result, like under ECSC law, all mergers
covered by EEC merger control law would fall exclusively under European law, with only one difference: ECSC law and related national competition law rules such as section 101 No. 3 of the German Act against
Restraints of Competition do not provide for an exemption similar to
article 20 (2) of the Commission's draft. It should also be noted that
article 20 (2) contains no criteria for such exemptions, thus giving the
Commission unlimited discretion in this respect.
The Commission's attempt to attribute to the planned regulation
such a sweeping preemptive force vis-A-vis the national merger control
laws of the member states, thereby excluding even the application of national law notification requirements, has led to critical reactions espe119. Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989) [hereinafter Amended Merger
Regulation].
120. See EC Continues Gradual Pace Towards Merger Control Regulation, 56 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 26 (January 5, 1989).
121. Article 2(2) provides: "Concentrations which do not create or strengthen a position as a
result of which the maintenance or development of effective competition would be impeded in the
common market or in a substantial part thereof shall be declared compatible with the common
market." Amended Merger Regulation, supra note 119, at 16.
122. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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cially from the German side, not only in the legal literature, 23 but also
politically. 24 My concern expressed at the end of part III of this article
that "exclusivity" of the new European merger control system, by shutting out effective national control systems in several member countries,
might eventually do more harm than good to competition in Europe appears to be all the more justified now that the Commission itself is openly
supporting the "exclusivity" claim originally advanced by the business
side. This change of the Commission's earlier position is not only highly
problematic from a competition policy point of view, but also raises the
constitutional law question of whether in the absence in the EEC Treaty
of a similar general clause as in the United States Constitution (Art. I § 8
cl. 3), to regulate interstate commerce, a council regulation can generally
preempt the application of national statutory law in all cases covered by
the regulation. Furthermore, I cannot see any justification why merger
control law, as far as the relationship between community and national
law is concerned, should be governed by substantially different rules than
the other parts of competition law. In regard to Article 85 of the EEC
Treaty there is general accord, based on the Dyestuff judgment of the
European Court, that the conflict area to be solved by community law
priority is limited to cases of express Commission authorizations under
Article 85(3).125 "Exclusivity" of merger control under the new regulation should therefore be restricted to the exceptional cases in which the
Commission expressly authorizes a merger under article 2(3). 126

123. See, e.g., Bunte, Das Verhaltnis von deutschem zu europaischemKartellrecht, 39 WuW 7, at
16-21 (1989);

K. MARKERT, NATIONALES KARTELLRECHT IM EUROPAISCHEN BINNEMARKT,

(1988). For an opposite view, see, e.g., Ebenroth & Parche, Der Verordnungsentwurfeinereuropaischen Fusionskontrolleund seine Auswirkungen auffnationales und internationalesKartellrecht, 1988
BB no. 33, annex 1, at 12-17.
124. See, e.g., Schlecht, Ganz ohne ein Nebeneinander von Bruissel und Berlin wird es nicht gehen,
HANDELSBLATT, Sept. 2-3, 1988. Schlecht is Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs.
125. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
126. Article 2(3) provides:
Concentrations which create or strengthen a position as a result of which the maintenance
or development of effective competition is impeded in the common market or in a substantial part thereof shall be declared incompatible with the common market unless authorized
on the ground that their contribution to improving production and distribution, to promoting technical or economic progress or to improving the competitive structure within the
common market outweighs the damage to competition. In this respect, the competitiveness of the sectors concerned with regard to international competition and the interests of
consumers shall be taken into account.
Amended Merger Regulation, supra note 119, at 16.
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APPENDIX

Excerpt from the 1985/1986 Activity Report
27
of the Federal Cartel Office 1
2.6

International Competitive Conditions

In analyzing the competitive situation on the relevant market, the FCO
attributes increasing importance to the influence of international competition. The workability of domestic competition depends to a large extent
also on actual and potential competition by foreign enterprises. Following the system of the ARC, the FCO bases its analysis of competitive
conditions on the domestic market or a part.thereof as the geographically
relevant market. From an economic point of view, the market where
competitive forces meet may extend beyond national borders. But even
where the economically relevant market is not identical with the domestic market, the market influences emanating from foreign competition
can be adequately taken into account by a "two-stage analysis." To the
extent that foreign suppliers are present on the German market their supplies are included already in the first stage. They are part of the domestically available market volume and are fully accounted for in the
calculation of market shares. If competitive relationships go beyond the
borders of the Federal Republic, but supplies from abroad so far have not
yet or only insignificantly occurred, the FCO examines in a second stage,
which competitive influences emanate from the foreign suppliers. Potential foreign competition is effective only, if domestic buyers, when confronted for example with excessive price demands or deteriorating
market performances by the domestic suppliers, can easily turn to foreign
suppliers. But these suppliers must be willing and capable to offer competitive products in Germany, and German buyers must have access to
international buying markets. Such supply alternatives exist especially as
far as demand for investment products by large commercial buyers is
concerned, for example as regards aeroplanes, ocean ships, machine tools
and construction of large production plants. Here the FCO did not oppose a number of mergers especially in view of international competitive
relations. Thus, the firm Friedrich Krupp GmbH could acquire a majority interest in the largest German baking machine manufacturer Werner
& Pfleiderer, because potential competition by the worldwide selling
British manufacturer Baker Perkins excluded the expectation of market
domination.
However, the effectiveness of potential competition is doubtful,
127. BUNDESKARTELLAMT, supra note 25, at 15-17.
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where actual supplies have for a long time not occurred and there is little
likelihood of a change. This applies above all to the consumer products
sector and generally where foreign suppliers, in spite of all liberalization
of world trade and trade within the EC, are still facing open or hidden
trade barriers. The more the various national markets are merging and
consumer habits are harmonizing, the more the definition of national
markets loses its importance. In regard to products with low transportation costs the shares of the various suppliers on the individual geographic
submarkets will more and more become identical, so that domestic market shares and world market shares are approaching each other and the
competitive situation on the domestic market largely reflects the competitive situation on world markets.
From time to time the accusation is made that the German merger
control, while correctly identifying the competitive conditions on the domestic markets, hinders German firms to maintain or expand their competitive position on foreign markets. This accusation is rebutted by
merger control practice.

